by KPMLAW | Jul 17, 2017 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by JH Revere, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. If you have worked in bodily injury claims for any period of time, you are no doubt aware there are two primary means by which the defense attempts to rebut a plaintiff’s medical claims prior to or at trial. They are, of course, the Independent Medical Examination (IME) and the Peer Review. Let’s start by looking at the framework for expert testimony in Virginia. Virginia Code § 8.01-401.1 addresses expert testimony at trial. It states in part: In any civil action, any expert witness may give testimony and render an opinion or draw inferences from facts, circumstances or data made known to or perceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which he is called upon to testify. The facts, circumstances or data relied upon by such witness in forming an opinion or drawing inferences, if of a type normally relied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence. The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. The statute clearly applies to both the peer review and the independent medical exam. The independent medical exam is further subject to additional criteria. Rule 4:10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia states in part: (a) Order for Examination. –When the mental or physical...
by KPMLAW | Jul 17, 2017 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Gary Reinhardt, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. The Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist statute, Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206, strictly controls how a carrier provides coverage to its insured. The statute limits what may be required of an insured by an insurer in order to obtain UM/UIM coverage. For instance, “No endorsement or provisions providing the coverage required by subsection A of this section shall require arbitration of any claim arising under the endorsement or provisions, nor may anything be required of the insured except the establishment of legal liability . . .” Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206(H). The Virginia Supreme Court interpreted this language from the Virginia UM/UIM statute to mean that “Under the statute, the obligation of the uninsured motorist insurer arises only if it is determined that the insured is ‘legally entitled to recover’ damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle… . Judgment is the event which determines legal entitlement to recovery.” Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 216 Va. 926, 929, 223 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1976). Based on this, some insurers did not participate in settlement negotiations with their insureds asserting UM claims. Plaintiffs, in turn, claimed bad faith based on the statutory language of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-66 (D) (1): Whenever a court of proper jurisdiction finds that an insurance company licensed in this Commonwealth to write insurance as defined in § 38.2-124 denies, refuses or fails to pay to its insured a claim of more than $3,500 in excess of the deductible, if any, under the provisions of a policy of motor vehicle insurance...
by KPMLAW | Jun 15, 2017 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Brian Cafritz, Esq. and Chris Bergin, Esq. In terms of sheer volume, the most relentless legal threat facing restaurant and retail owners is the deluge of slip and fall claims. Fortunately for Virginia-based businesses, the premises liability law within the Commonwealth tends to be defense-friendly. For a Plaintiff to establish a claim of premises liability against a restaurant or retail owner, he must prove that he was harmed by a known danger on the property. Typically, this boils down to two issues: Did a dangerous condition exist on the premises? And did the Defendant have notice of that danger prior to the Plaintiff’s accident? The second issue—whether a business had notice of a dangerous condition— is the most litigated. There are three ways a Plaintiff can establish notice: (1) by proving that the Defendant had actual notice of a dangerous condition; (2) by proving that the Defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition; or (3) by proving that the Defendant created the dangerous condition by its own affirmative conduct. Each method of establishing notice comes with its own legal standard, which the Plaintiff must meet. Most of the case law in Virginia focuses on the legal standards for establishing actual and constructive notice, which are both typically rigid and defense-friendly standards. Plaintiff’s, however, often try an end around the notice hurdle by arguing a concept known as The Genesis Doctrine. Under this theory, the Defendant is charged with notice for any reasonably foreseeable dangers created by its conduct. In other words, because the Defendant is the “Genesis of the condition,” notice is presumed if the danger...
by KPMLAW | Jun 15, 2017 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Stephanie G. Cook, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. Virginia Code Section 38.2-2206(F) provides, in part: If any action is instituted against the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle by any insured intending to rely on the uninsured or underinsured coverage provision or endorsement of this policy under which the insured is making a claim, then the insured shall serve a copy of the process upon this insurer in the manner prescribed by law, as though the insurer were a party defendant. A circuit court in Virginia recently examined the service provisions of this statute and overruled an underinsured motorist carrier’s plea in bar in which the carrier requested dismissal on the basis that it was not served within one year of the filing of the complaint. Jones v. Goldsborough, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 189. In Goldsborough, an accident occurred on April 11, 2013. The plaintiff filed suit on March 8, 2015. The defendant was served on December 29, 2015, within the one year limitation prescribed by Va. Code § 8.01-275.1. The underinsured motorist carrier was served on March 23, 2016, after the one year anniversary of the filing date. In overruling the insurer’s plea in bar, the court reiterated that the service of process rules under Va. Code § 8.01-275.1 and Rule 3:5(e) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia do not apply to uninsured or underinsured motorist carriers. Those provisions apply only to named defendants. They require service of process upon a defendant within twelve months of commencement of an action. The court reasoned that service of...
by KPMLAW | Jun 15, 2017 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Helen Jhun, Esq. Edited by Bill Pfund, Esq. As the weather warms, schools across Virginia recess for summer. Families throughout the state look forward to a few months of rest, relaxation, and recreation. Along with the fun that comes with recreational activities, there are also specific risks when participating in these activities, especially when children are involved. This article will address some of specific issues that arise in defending these types of claims. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk for Minors Under Virginia law, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are complete bars to recovery. However, the considerations differ when the plaintiff is a child. A child under seven years of age is incapable of being contributorily negligent. Atlantic C.L.C. Co. v. Clements , 184 Va. 656, 664-665, 36 S.E. 553, 557 (1946). A child between 7 and 14 is presumed to be incapable of negligence. However, this is a rebuttable presumption, and such a child can be contributorily negligent upon evidence that 1) the child had the capacity to understand the nature and perils associated with his conduct based upon his age, intelligence and experience and that 2) the child’s conduct did not conform to the standard of a reasonable person of the same age, intelligence and experience. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee 258 Va. 235, 520 S.E.,2d 164 (1999). A child between the ages of fourteen and eighteen is held to the degree of care which persons of the same age, experience, intelligence, discretion and knowledge would exercise under the circumstances. Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 427 S.E.2d 189...
by KPMLAW | Jun 12, 2017 | KPMBlog, News, Profiles, Uncategorized
Written by Rachel Riordan, Esq. Edited by Claire Carr, Esq. Animal attack cases are not uncommon events and animal bites often raise interesting compensability questions in workers’ compensation cases. According to the Humane Society of the United States, there are approximately 78.2 million owned dogs in the country and about 40 percent of all households have at least one dog or cat. The United States Department of Agriculture estimates there are over 4,000 bee species in the country and bee allergies are becoming more prevalent. The animal encounter cases from the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission include horses, snakes, spiders, ticks, and even a compensable cat attack! When evaluating animal bite cases, it is important to remember that Virginia is an “actual risk” state and not a “positional risk” state. In other words, the mere happening of an accident in the workplace is not compensable unless certain criteria are met. Most significantly, the accident must “arise out of” the employment. There must be a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. With respect to animal bites, the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act requires that the injury be fairly traced to the circumstances or environment of the claimant’s employment. Milton v. Gibson Lumber Co., VWC File No. 224-32-58 (Sept. 22, 2006). The employment must expose the claimant to a greater risk than the general public. For example, benefits were awarded in Fuller v. Randolph M. Bailey t/a Wet Pets, 67 O.I.C. 35 (1988), where the employee was working in a pet store and was bitten by a spider, and in Phelps...
