The issues of negligence and liability in two-vehicle rear-end motor vehicle accidents are generally straight forward. Under long established Virginia law, there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence against a driver who rear-ends a lawfully stopped vehicle. Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 415 S.E.2d 436 (1992), Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81, 387 S.E.2d 473 (1990). However, defending multiple vehicle rear-end accidents is unique. The issue of causation and assigning the negligence and liability to the different vehicles involved is often in dispute. Specifically, the defenses of third party negligence and contributory negligence are often asserted in rebutting the presumption of negligence against the rear-ending vehicle in “chain reaction” accidents.
In the case of Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 151 S.E.2d 339 (1966), the Supreme Court of Virginia discusses the issues of third party negligence and superseding causation as defenses in a multiple vehicle rear-end accident. In the Maroulis case, Defendant Maroulis was the fourth vehicle in a seven vehicle caravan. The lead car swerved left to avoid another vehicle, driving toward him in the wrong direction. The vehicle driving in the wrong direction collided head on with the second vehicle in the caravan. The third vehicle in the caravan swerved and braked, avoiding a collision with the second vehicle. Maroulis then collided with the third vehicle, and then plowed into the second vehicle. At trial, Maroulis asserted the defense of unforeseeable, intervening negligence, arguing that the negligence of the car driving in the wrong direction cut off his own negligence. The trial jury found against Maroulis. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the jury’s finding, ruling that Maroulis had the ultimate duty to keep a reasonable lookout for the sudden stopping of vehicles and to keep a reasonable distance. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that there is always a “likelihood of sudden stopping,” and every driver knows that vehicles may stop suddenly for various reasons. In this case, the collision occurred when Maroulis rear ended the second and third vehicles. As such, the negligence of the vehicle driving in the wrong direction did not relieve Maroulis’ own duties to keep a proper lookout and keep a proper distance.
This case is significant because it holds that even if a chain reaction is initially caused by the negligence of a third party, the driver of a vehicle is still charged with knowing of the “likelihood of sudden stopping.” This case is particularly important in cases where you are defending the vehicle alleged to have started the chain reaction—in the Maroulis case, the vehicle driving in the wrong direction.
Then recently, in an appeal decided on December 3, 2015, the Virginia Supreme Court undertook the question of “sudden stopping” in multiple vehicle rear-ender accidents in the context of contributory negligence. In the case of Martin v. Isbill, the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a set of facts that is seen quite frequently in multiple vehicle rear-end accidents. Plaintiff Martin was operating her vehicle in heavy traffic, behind a white pickup truck that she could not see around. The white truck moved abruptly to the right lane, and Plaintiff saw a vehicle stopped in her lane of travel. Plaintiff was unable change her lane, applied her brakes, but was unable to avoid colliding with the stopped vehicle, driven by Defendant Isbill. She collided with the rear of Isbill’s vehicle. She was then rear-ended by the vehicle behind her, driven by Defendant King.
Plaintiff Martin, the middle vehicle in a three vehicle chain reaction accident, brought suit against both Isbill and King. During trial, Isbill testified that he had stopped his vehicle because he was attempting to change lanes and had been stopped for three to five seconds. Martin testified that she was driving approximately 40-45 miles per hour, following the flow of traffic. Martin also testified she was traveling approximately one and one-half car lengths behind the white truck in front of her. Likewise, Defendant King testified that he was driving approximately 40-45 miles per hour, following traffic. However, King testified that he was driving 4 to 5 car lengths behind Plaintiff.
Both Isbill and King moved to strike Plaintiff’s evidence. Following the logic found in the Marsoulis case, both Isbill and King asserted that Plaintiff Martin was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to keep a proper lookout and proper distance when she rear-ended Isbill’s vehicle. King had the additional argument that if King was driving 4 to 5 car lengths behind Plaintiff, then “it had to follow suit that Martin was also following too closely” because Plaintiff Martin was driving one and a half car lengths behind the white truck. At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court did grant the defendants’ motions to strike, and ruled that Martin was negligent as a matter of law because “she was traveling 40-45 miles an hour, one length behind the white truck that was immediately in front of her and unable to switch lanes because of the heavy traffic.”
However, upon appeal, Plaintiff Martin argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the evidence adduced at trial created jury issues as to whether Martin or King was negligent, and if so, whether that negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
The Court in Martin held that the question of whether Martin was travelling at an excessive speed or was following too closely were issues for the jury to decide. Specifically, “Virginia law imposes no set formula as to how many car lengths must be maintained between vehicles at any given speed.” Instead, one most not follow another motor vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, and this question was for a jury to decide.
Furthermore, even if Martin was negligent, the facts still created a jury issue as to whether her negligence was a proximate cause of the collision with Isbill’s vehicle. Because Martin did not collide with the white truck, a jury could have reasonably concluded that even if she were following the truck too closely, Martin’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.
This case is particularly important in cases where you are defending a vehicle unable to avoid a rear-end accident as a result of sudden stopping, and should be helpful in avoiding motions to find negligence as a matter of law in rear-end accidents.