Editor – Janeen B. Koch, Esquire
Author – Randall C. Lenhart, Jr., Esquire
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently addressed the issue of when to exclude evidence when the prejudicial effect substantially exceeds its probative value in Julia Cain, et al. v. Joe Lee, 2015 Va. LEXIS 77 (June 4, 2015) as it relates to post-accident conduct by the defendant in determining punitive damages. In Cain, Julia Cain was driving with her daughters in their vehicle when she began to slow her vehicle due to traffic in front of her. As she slowed down, a vehicle being driven by the defendant rear-ended the Cains’ vehicle which caused the Cains’ vehicle to collide with the car in front of it.
After the accident, the state trooper who responded to the scene determined that the defendant was possibly intoxicated due to his appearance and the presence of a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant failed a field sobriety test and then consented to a preliminary breath test which registered a blood alcohol content of .25 (over three times the legal limit of .08). After being arrested and brought before the magistrate, the defendant refused to submit to a breath test which resulted in him being charged with unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-268.3 and driving under the influence (“DUI”) in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-266. At the traffic hearing, the defendant pled guilty to DUI and the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi the charge for the unreasonable refusal charge pursuant to a plea bargain.
Julia Cain and her two daughters subsequently filed separate lawsuits against the defendant for compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant was uninsured at the time of the accident so the plaintiffs served the insurance carrier for the vehicle they were riding in pursuant to Virginia Code § 38.2-2206. After the lawsuits were filed the defendant was arrested for a second DUI. He was convicted and sentenced to twelve months in jail with nine months suspended. As a condition of his probation, the defendant was required to participate in the Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Program (“VASAP”) and to abstain from the use of alcohol. However, the defendant failed during his participation in VASAP and as a result he was expelled from the program and required to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence.
Prior to the trial of the consolidated lawsuits against the defendant, he admitted liability and filed a motion in limine to exclude from trial evidence of his second DUI conviction and his expulsion from VASAP. The Cains wanted to introduce this evidence to show that the defendant was indifferent to the pain and suffering he had caused them, thereby making it competent, relevant, and material evidence for determining punitive damages. The trial Court granted the defendant’s motion in limine and excluded the evidence of the second DUI conviction and expulsion from VASAP.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s decision. In doing so, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized that a “trial court may exclude evidence when, in the court’s sound discretion, its prejudicial effect substantially exceeds its probative value.” Boone v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 597, 602, 740 S.E.2d 11, 13 (2013). The Court found that the proffered evidence regarding the second DUI and expulsion from VASAP had no direct connection to the motor vehicle accident and even if offered for the limited purpose of determining the amount of punitive damages, such evidence was “likely to inflame the passion or instill a prejudice in the minds of the jury.” Virginia-Lincoln Furniture Corp. v. Southern Factories & Stores Corp., 162 Va. 767, 781, 174 S.E. 848, 854 (1934). As a result, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the post-accident evidence was “ostensibly highly prejudicial.”
In deciding whether the evidence had any probative value, the Court looked at the language of the statute on which the Cains based their claim for punitive damages. Pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-44.5, relating to a defendant’s unreasonable refusal to submit to a breath test, a defendant’s conduct is sufficient for punitive damages when the evidence proves that (a) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred the defendant was intoxicated, which may be established by evidence concerning the conduct or condition of the defendant; (b) at the time the defendant began drinking alcohol, or during the time he was drinking alcohol, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (c) the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff or death of the plaintiff’s decedent.
The Court determined that Virginia Code § 8.01-44.5 had specific time based references that limited the consideration of punitive damages to the defendant’s knowledge and physical condition leading up to and directly related to the defendant’s act. Nothing in the statute allowed the jury to consider post-accident evidence that was not directly related to the acts in question. Because no unrelated post-accident evidence could be considered in determining whether to award punitive damages, the Court determined that such evidence, by definition, had no probative value. Consequently, the Court determined that the evidence was properly excluded because it was highly prejudicial and had no probative value.
This is an important case to remember in the future should a question arise related to the defendant’s post-accident conduct; particularly in cases involving DUI and punitive damages.